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Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1990 Term 
Robert E. Riggs* 
Guy L. Black** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article is the fifth annual survey of Supreme Court 
voting behavior presented by the BYU JOURNAL OF PuBLIC 
LAW. 1 As in previous years, it examines the positions taken by 
each member of the Supreme Court on selected categories of 
cases decided during the immediately preceding term. The 
classification scheme is designed to provide indicators of the 
justices' views on important dimensions of constitutional 
interpretation and individual rights. 
Nine of the categories are based on the nature of the issues 
or the character of the parties. A tenth category tabulates the 
number of times each justice voted with the majority in cases 
decided by a single vote. The issue and party categories are: 
1) Civil controversies in which a state, or one of its officials 
or political subdivisions, is opposed by a private party. 
2) Civil controversies in which the federal government, or 
one of its agencies or officials, is opposed by a private party. 
3) State criminal cases. 
4) Federal criminal cases. 
5) First amendment issues of speech, press, association, 
and free exercise of religion. 
6) Equal protection issues. 
7) Statutory civil rights claims. 
8) Issues of federal court jurisdiction, standing, 
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1. Previous articles in this series began with Robert E. Riggs, Supreme Court 
Voting Behavior: 1986 Term, 2 BYU J. PuB. L. 15 (1988). 
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justiciability and related matters. 
9) Federalism issues. 
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Tables 1-9 present voting data for these nine issue-related 
categories. Table 10 deals with cases decided by a single vote. 
Each of the first nine categories is intended to reveal 
attitudes of the justices toward two broad issues underlying 
most Supreme Court decision-making-individual rights and 
judicial restraint. The tables relating to criminal prosecutions, 
first amendment issues, the equal protection clause and civil 
rights statutes speak directly to individual rights. Civil suits 
between governmental and private parties, reported in the first 
two tables, also raise issues of individual rights because such 
suits necessarily place government in opposition to claims of 
private rights. Decisions in the federalism category have less 
obvious relevance for individual rights because such decisions 
focus on the proper balance of federal and state authority. 
Nevertheless, the usual practical effect of a vote for the state in 
such cases is to disappoint a party seeking federal relief from 
alleged state encroachment upon his or her rights. 
Judicial restraint, the second broad underlying issue, is 
normally identified with deference to legislatures as the policy-
making branch of government, respect for precedent, avoidance 
of constitutional questions when narrower grounds for decision 
exist, avoidance of unnecessary decisions, and respect for the 
framers' intent (when ascertainable) in construing 
constitutional text. 2 Decisions on jurisdictional questions 
capture one aspect of judicial restraint-the relative propensity 
of the justices to avoid unnecessary decisions. Decisions on 
ind,ividual rights also have implications for judicial restraint. 
As a hands-off policy, judicial restraint commonly favors the 
government rather than the individual who claims rights 
against the government. This is so because the individual's 
attempt to obtain new rights usually requires the Court to 
overturn precedent or declare an existing statute 
unconstitutional. Judicial restraint is also likely to be identified 
with respect for the role of states within the federal system. 
2. For a discussion of judicial restraint, see Charles M. Lamb, Judicial 
Restraint on the Supreme Court, in SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 7 
(Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982) and DAVID F. FORTE, THE 
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM V. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
(1972). 
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Despite these common relationships, judicial restraint and 
concern for individual rights are not necessarily opposite poles 
of a single attitudinal dimension. In certain instances, judicial 
restraint may be consistent with, and even reinforce individual 
rights. For example, if existing precedent grants extensive 
protection to individual rights, a judge who resists efforts to 
undermine the precedent is exercising restraint and also acting 
to preserve individual rights. 3 Thus, respect for precedent, 
avoidance of constitutional questions and unnecessary 
decisions, deference to states, and allegiance to the framers' 
intent can cut either way with respect to individual rights, 
depending on the facts. 4 
More often than not, however, there is tension between 
individual rights and judicial restraint. Deference to 
legislatures frequently means rejection of an individual's claim, 
especially one predicated upon the impropriety of governmental 
action. Emphasis upon the framers' intent is often associated 
with unwillingness to read new individual rights into the 
Constitution. Refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction leaves the 
matter to state courts with their possible bias in favor of 
actions by state government claims, and is a clear rebuff to the 
claimant seeking federal vindication of his or her rights. In the 
voting tabulations that follow, most of the data supporting an 
inference of judicial restraint, or the lack of it, will also be 
consistent, respectively, with a narrow or a broad view of 
individual rights. 
3. At least one author feels that the distinction between activism and restraint 
is neutral as to issues of liberal or conservative politics. Perhaps he even implies 
that concern for individual rights, traditionally viewed as a characteristic of liberal 
judges, is not always inconsistent with judicial restraint. JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CULT 
OF THE COURT 69 (1987). 
I d. 
Like independence at the more general level, restraint is neither liberal 
nor conservative, but unlike independence, the political implication of 
activism and restraint depend on what has come before, the body of law 
whether judge-made or statutory from which the judicial stance acquires 
its politics. A restrained judge operating from a received body of law that 
is "liberal," like the legacy of the Warren Court, will give the polity 
liberal decisions. 
4. Judicial activism, rather than judicial restraint, could be a barrier to 
individual rights claims if a conservative court takes the place of a liberal court 
and begins to limit previously established rights. 
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II. THE VOTING RECORD 
TABLE 1 
CIVIL CASES: STATE GOVERNMENT 
VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY 
Justice 1990 Term Votes o/o Votes for Government 
For Against 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Gov't Gov't Term Term Term Term Term 
Rehnquist 21 4 84.0 70.3 66.7 67.9 71.8 
Kennedy 19 6 76.0 61.1 57.1 50.0 
O'Connor 17 8 68.0 67.6 57.4 50.0 64.1 
Scalia 16 9 64.0 64.9 59.2 51.7 64.1 
White 16 9 64.0 59.5 55.1 53.6 43.6 
Souter 14 8 63.6 
Stevens 9 16 36.0 40.5 35.4 37.9 46.2 
Marshall 7 18 28.0 27.0 21.3 34.5 30.8 
Blackmun 6 19 24.0 43.2 30.6 44.8 36.8 
Majority 
All Cases 16 9 64.0 51.4 51.0 51.7 53.9 
Split Decisions 11 5 68.8 52.4 64.0 58.8 
Unanimous 5 4 55.6 50.0 50.0 37.5 41.7 
TABLE 2 
CIVIL CASES: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY 
Justice 1990 Term Votes o/o Votes for Government 
For Against 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Gov't Gov't Term Term Term Term Term 
Rehnquist 14 6 70.0 78.6 71.4 61.8 90.6 
White 14 6 70.0 75.0 71.4 72.7 87.1 
Blackmun 12 8 60.0 64.3 60.7 50.0 53.1 
O'Connor 12 8 60.0 60.7 60.7 76.5 75.0 
Scalia 11 8 57.9 60.7 59.3 62.5 82.8 
Kennedy 10 8 55.6 60.7 66.7 58.3 
Souter 10 8 55.6 
Marshall 11 9 55.0 50.0 39.3 44.1 46.9 
Stevens 8 12 40.0 57.1 42.9 55.9 50.0 
Majority 
All Cases 12 8 60.0 71.4 64.3 61.8 68.8 
Split Decisions 6 4 60.0 66.7 66.7 55.6 
Unanimous 6 4 60.0 76.9 61.5 68.8 
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TABLE 3 
STATE CRIMINAL CASES 
Justice 1990 Term Votes o/o Votes for Government 
For Against 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Gov't Gov't Term Term Term Term Term 
Rehnquist 22 5 81.5 85.3 85.2 73.7 87.9 
Scalia 20 7 74.1 73.5 77.8 47.4 81.8 
Souter 17 8 68.0 
O'Connor 18 9 66.7 76.5 77.8 61.1 75.8 
Kennedy 16 11 57.7 73.5 81.5 70.0 
White 13 14 48.1 73.5 77.8 47.4 81.8 
Blackmun 4 23 14.8 35.3 37.0 26.3 30.3 
Marshall 0 27 0.0 8.8 14.8 5.3 3.0 
Stevens 0 27 0.0 20.6 37.0 21.1 21.2 
Majority 
All Cases 15 12 55.6 64.7 70.4 47.4 60.6 
Split Decisions 15 7 68.2 70.0 72.7 53.8 
Unanimous 0 5 0 25.0 60.0 16.7 
TABLE 4 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 
Justice 1990 Term Votes o/o Votes for Government 
For Against 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Gov't Gov't Term Term Term Term Term 
Souter 6 2 75.0 
Blackman 7 3 70.0 44.4 55.6 78.6 30.0 
O'Connor 7 3 70.0 77.8 77.8 71.4 90.0 
Rehnquist 7 3 70.0 77.8 88.9 85.7 80.0 
Stevens 6 4 60.0 33.3 66.7 64.3 40.0 
White 6 4 60.0 77.8 88.9 85.7 90.0 
Kennedy 5 5 50.0 66.7 88.9 71.4 
Marshall 5 5 50.0 11.1 33.3 28.6 0.0 
Scalia 4 6 40.0 66.7 66.7 64.3 70.0 
Majority 
All Cases 6 4 60.0 66.7 88.9 78.6 60.0 
Split Decisions 3 3 50.0 83.3 100.0 75.0 
Unanimous 3 75.0 33.3 66.7 100.0 
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TABLE 5 
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF EXPRESSION, 
ASSOCIATION, AND FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 
Justice 1990 Term Votes o/o Votes for Rights Claim 
For Against 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Claim Claim Term Term Term Term Term 
Blackmun 9 4 69.2 60.0 41.2 69.2 72.7 
Marshall 8 5 61.5 73.3 76.5 84.6 91.7 
O'Connor 6 5 54.5 26.7 25.0 23.1 45.5 
Stevens 6 6 50.0 46.7 64.7 50.0 50.0 
Kennedy 5 7 41.7 40.0 37.5 66.7 
Souter 5 7 41.7 
Scalia 3 9 25.0 26.7 35.3 38.5 36.4 
Rehnquiest 2 10 16.7 13.3 18.8 16.7 16.7 
White 2 11 15.4 20.0 23.5 30.8 41.7 
Majority 
All Cases 3 9 25.0 40.0 35.3 50.0 58.3 
Split Decisions 3 7 30.0 40.0 22.2 50.0 
Unanimous 0 2 0.0 40.0 50.0 50.0 
TABLE 6 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS 
Justice 1990 Term Votes o/o Votes for Rights Claim 
For Against 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Claim Claim Term Term Term Term Term 
Marshall 5 0 100.0 0.0 50.0 37.5 71.4 
Blackmun 5 83.3 0.0 60.0 50.0 57.1 
Stevens 5 83.3 0.0 66.7 28.6 33.3 
Souter 3 3 50.0 
Kennedy 3 4 42.9 25.0 57.1 33.3 
White 3 4 42.9 0.0 66.7 12.5 28.6 
O'Connor 2 5 28.6 25.0 66.7 12.5 42.9 
Rehnquist 6 14.3 20.0 57.1 12.5 14.3 
Scalia 6 14.3 25.0 57.1 12.5 14.3 
Majority 
All Cases 3 4 42.9 0.0 57.1 12.5 14.3 
Split Decisions 2 2 50.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Unanimous 2 33.3 0.0 50.0 20.0 
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TABLE 7 
STATUTORY CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS 
Justice 1990 Term Votes o/o Votes for Rights Claim 
For Against 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Claim Claim Term Term Term Term Term 
Marshall 13 2 86.7 100.0 94.4 87.5 84.6 
Blackmun 12 3 80.0 88.9 80.0 87.5 84.6 
Stevens 12 3 80.0 77.8 73.7 87.5 61.5 
Souter 8 6 57.1 
O'Connor 8 7 53.3 55.6 52.6 42.9 30.8 
White 8 7 53.3 88.9 55.0 62.5 61.5 
Scalia 7 8 46.7 55.6 40.0 57.1 38.5 
Rehnquist 5 10 33.3 44.4 35.0 37.5 38.5 
Kennedy 5 10 33.3 62.5 45.0 66.7 
Majority 
All Cases 8 7 53.3 88.9 50.0 75.0 53.9 
Split Decisions 3 6 33.3 83.3 25.0 60.0 
Unanimous 5 83.3 100.0 87.5 100.0 
TABLE 8 
CASES RAISING A CHALLENGE TO 
THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION 
Justice 1990 Term Votes o/o Votes for Jurisdiction 
For Against 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Juris Juris Term Term Term Term Term 
Stevens 32 3 91.4 68.0 73.0 57.1 71.4 
Marshall 30 5 85.7 87.5 75.0 57.1 57.1 
Blackmun 28 7 80.0 79.2 64.9 58.1 64.3 
White 23 13 63.9 68.0 62.2 51.2 71.4 
Kennedy 21 15 58.3 64.0 51.4 56.3 
Souter 19 14 57.6 
O'Connor 19 16 54.3 68.0 51.4 42.9 64.3 
Rehnquist 19 16 54.3 60.0 51.4 47.6 67.9 
Scalia 16 17 48.5 60.0 50.0 36.6 61.5 
Majority 
All Cases 23 13 63.9 64.0 62.2 55.8 60.7 
Split Decisions 6 10 38.9 33.0 62.5 71.4 
Unanimous 17 3 88.9 81.3 61.9 48.3 
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TABLE 9 
FEDERALISM CASES 
Justice 1990 Term Votes o/o Votes for State Claim 
For For 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
State Fed Term Term Term Term Term 
Souter 5 83.3 
Kennedy 5 2 71.4 56.3 72.7 33.3 
O'Connor 5 2 71.4 56.3 73.7 33.3 
Rehnquist 5 2 71.4 56.3 81.0 46.2 
Scalia 5 2 71.4 56.3 76.2 30.8 
White 4 3 57.1 43.8 63.6 30.8 
Stevens 2 5 28.6 43.8 57.1 46.2 
Blackmun 6 14.3 43.8 40.9 46.2 
Marshall 6 14.3 37.5 33.3 53.8 
Majority 
All Cases 5 2 71.4 43.8 59.1 38.5 
Split Decisions 4 80.0 25.0 50.0 33.3 
Unanimous 50.0 50.0 70.0 42.9 
TABLE 10 
SWING-VOTE ANLAYSIS: WHO VOTES MOST OFTEN 
WITH THE MAJORITY IN CLOSE CASES 
Justice 1990 Term Votes o/o Votes with Majority 
For Against 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Maj. Maj. Term Term Term Term Term 
O'Connor 16 1 69.6 69.0 76.5 64.5 
Rehnquist 16 2 69.6 66.7 76.5 70.0 
White 14 2 60.9 78.6 76.5 77.4 
Souter 13. 2 59.1 
Kennedy 12 2 52.2 71.4 82.4 71.4 
Scalia 12 3 52.2 66.7 73.5 66.7 
Blackmun 11 5 47.8 33.3 38.2 45.2 
Stevens 11 6 47.8 42.9 26.5 61.3 
Marshall 10 6 43.5 35.7 23.5 38.7 
Conservative 
Coalition 12 10 54.5 64.3 76.5 64.5 
Liberal 
Coalition 12 10 45.5 35.7 23.5 35.5 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A list of cases included in each of the ten tables and the 
criteria governing their selection are presented in an appendix 
to this article. Each case was read and coded by three readers, 
and differences were discussed in order to achieve consensus on 
the appropriate classification. The result undoubtedly falls 
short of perfect validity and reliability, but we believe that 
other readers using the same coding criteria would arrive at 
substantially the same results. 
Still, some classification problems of judgment remain. One 
example is Burns u. Reed,5 in which a state prosecutor claimed 
absolute immunity from civil liability for giving advice to police 
officers that led to a violation of the plaintiffs rights. All 
members of the Court agreed that the prosecutor was only 
entitled to qualified immunity in his role as advice-giver, and 
in that sense all voted against the government. But three 
justices would have denied the prosecutor absolute immunity 
for initiating a search-warrant proceeding as well. Since three 
justices were relatively less favorable to the prosecutor, we 
classified them as voting "against the government" in contrast 
to the six who were "for the government." Most of the cases fit 
with little distortion into a dichotomous classification of "for" or 
"against," but a few, like Burns, leave room for differences of 
opinion regarding how a particular justice's vote should be 
coded.6 
With that caveat, a brief discussion of the statistical tables 
may be helpful. The first four tables represent categories which 
are, for the most part, mutually exclusive. A case coded in one 
of the categories will not ordinarily be included in any of the 
other three. By definition, a case would not be categorized as 
both civil and criminal, nor would a case on appeal involve a 
simultaneous federal and state prosecution. 7 However, a civil 
5. 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991). 
6. Sometimes a classification must be based on inference. For example, in 
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of 
Aircraft Noise, 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991), six members of the Court addressed the 
issue of plaintiffs standing, but the dissent made no reference to it. Because the 
dissent addressed the merits of the case, and would have decided the issue against 
the plaintiff, we assumed that the dissent accepted the majority's judgment on the 
standing question. 
7. Both federal and state court action are involved in a federal habeas corpus 
review of a state prosecution, but such cases are classified as state rather than 
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suit having a private party on one side and both a state and a 
federal agency or official on the other is possible. Two cases of 
that nature were decided during the 19908 term and were 
included in both Tables 1 and 2. 
Tables 5-9, the issue categories, do not comprise mutually 
exclusive categories either among themselves or with the party 
categories. A case raising more than one relevant issue is 
included in each relevant category. An action by a private party 
against a state, for example, might raise issues pertaining to 
the first amendment, equal protection and jurisdiction. If so, it 
would be included in all three issue tables, as well as in Table 
1 (State v. Private party). The voting alignment would not 
necessarily be the same for each issue. 9 A single case may also 
be included more than once in the same category. This occurs 
when the facts raise two or more distinct issues affecting the 
disposition of the case and the issues are decided by different 
voting alignments. 10 
A brieflook at the behavior of the Court as a whole may be 
helpful before turning to the voting of the individual justices 
within each of the ten categories. In particular, the data can 
provide a basis for appraising the extent of the Court's shift 
toward greater conservatism in recent terms. As decisions are 
federal criminal cases. See, e.g., Lozada v. Deeds, 111 S. Ct. 860 (1991). 
8. In Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 111 S. Ct. 415 (1991), the city and the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission were on the same side of the dispute. In 
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of 
Aircraft Noise, 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991), the local governmental agency was 
petitioner and the· United States a respondent, but the United States argued in 
support of the petitioner (Airport Authority) and thus was classified as being on 
the same side. 
9. To illustrate, in Renne v. Geary, 111 S. Ct. 2331 (1991), the Court 
dismissed a challenge to California's ban on political party endorsement of 
candidates for non-partisan office, holding by a 6-3 margin that the issue was not 
ripe for resolution. The alignment in the jurisdiction category thus was 6-3, but in 
Table 1 (civil, state) the alignment was 7-2 because Justice White supported the 
government's position on first amendment grounds. The case is also included in the 
first amendment table, with two justices supporting and one (White) opposing the 
claim. The other six justices took no position on the first amendment issue. 
10. To cite an extreme example, Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, 111 S. 
Ct. 1950 (1991), raised first amendment issues that resulted in four different 
voting alignments. The broad question was whether the Ferris Faculty Association, 
in effect the faculty union, could require non-members of the Association to pay 
union dues. The Court canvassed the Association's activities one by one to 
determine whether non-members, consistent with the first amendment, could be 
required to support those activities against their will. The various sub-issues 
derived from this canvassing were decided by votes of 9-0, 8-1, 6-3 and 5-4. 
1] SUPREME COURT VOTING 11 
analyzed in our tables, a conservative position would ordinarily 
be inferred from a vote favoring the government, a vote against 
a claim of constitutional or statutory rights, a vote against the 
exercise of jurisdiction, or a vote in favor of state (rather than 
federal) authority on federalism questions. 
There are, however, exceptions to this general rule. 
Approximately one-third of the decisions were unanimous, 
indicating that the law or the facts of the case, or both, pointed 
so clearly one way that there was little room for liberal or 
conservative ideologies. In a few other cases, the peculiar 
nature of the facts created a reverse of the expected 
relationship, with liberals opposing a civil rights claim and 
conservatives supporting the claim. A good illustration of the 
latter phenomenon is Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association/1 
in which non-union faculty members at a state college raised 
first amendment objections to paying union dues. Support of a 
first amendment claim is ordinarily a liberal position, but 
traditionally liberal Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens 
voted against the claim in most of its applications, while the 
more conservative Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia and 
Souter took the opposite position. The role of the union, 
apparently, was the dominating issue for these justices and 
their votes reflected attitudes toward labor unions. rather than 
the first amendment. 12 Despite such exceptional cases, the 
expected general correlation between ideology and voting is 
apparent in the tables. 
With the replacement of Justice Brennan by Justice 
Souter, we might have expected pronounced movement by the 
Court in a conservative direction this year. 13 In fact, only a 
11. Id. 
12. Justice White and Chief Justice Rehnquist were not re·oriented by the 
context of this case. Both assumed their usual posture of opposition to first 
amendment claims. 
13. One must use caution in interpreting the data because the percentages are 
affected not only by the behavior of individual justices but also by the nature of 
the cases decided each year. A vote to uphold a higher percentage of criminal 
convictions in a given year may mean that an individual justice or the Court has 
become tougher on criminal defendants. Alternatively, it may only mean that this 
year the facts or the law (or both) of a number of individual cases were less 
favorable to defendants than in previous years. Comparable variables affect other 
categories of cases. Hence, one cannot be confident that percentage changes from 
one year to the next reflect a change in ideological orientation of an individual 
justice, or of the Court majority. Similar directional changes across a number of 
tables, however, would strengthen the hypothesis that a genuine shift in attitude 
has occurred. There is, of course, the possibility that a change in the priorities or 
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very modest shift occurred. Change over time in the decisions 
of the Court as a whole is indicated by the percentage figures 
in the bottom two rows of each table. For Tables 1-9, the first 
of these two rows gives figures for all decisions, whatever the 
voting alignment, while the second row is limited to decisions 
with one or more dissenting votes. For all cases, as compared 
with the 1989 term, a more conservative result appears in 
Tables 1, 5, 7 and 9 (state civil cases, first amendment issues, 
statutory civil rights and federalism issues). On the other hand, 
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 6 (federal civil cases, state criminal cases, 
federal criminal cases and equal protection cases) point in a 
less conservative direction as compared with the previous year. 
For Table 8 Gurisdiction) the percentage figure is virtually 
identical (63.9%, 64%). While these indicators show that the 
Court voted more often for a conservative result (pro-
government, anti-rights) than for a liberal one, the figures for 
all cases show no pronounced movement in either direction 
when compared with the 1989 term. 
In some respects a better measure is found in the bottom 
row of the tables, which includes only decisions marked by at 
least one dissenting vote. 14 Counting only split decisions 
creates a smaller universe of cases, but it has the advantage of 
including only those in which ideological differences might have 
affected the voting. The split decision voting produces 
percentages somewhat different from the figures for all cases, 
but the overall result seems to differ very little. Tables 1, 5, 7, 
and 9 show more conservative voting than last year. Tables 2, 
4, 6, and 8 record a more liberal outcome. The percentage 
difference in Table 3 is too small (1.8 percentage points) to be 
meaningful. On its face, the split decision data, like the data 
for all decisions, shows no consistent directional change-four 
attitudes of members of the Court could introduce some hidden bias into the 
process by which cases are selected for review, resulting in the selection of cases 
in which the government's (or the individual's) position is particularly strong. 
However, bias in the case selection process is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
For persons interested in the method by which the Court grants certiorari, see 
BRIGHAM, supra note 3, at 178-82. 
14. This refers mainly to unanimous decisions, but includes a few in which one 
or more justices did not participate or did not address the issue. 
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tables point in one direction and four in the other, with one 
showing no significant change. 15 
On closer examination of the relevant cases, however, the 
figures in Table 6 (equal protection) are misleading as an 
indicator of ideological direction. During the 1990 term two of 
four split votes on equal protection issues were decided in favor 
of the claimant (50%), compared with a single split vote the 
preceding year which went against the claimant (0% for the 
claimant). Apart from the problem of generalizing from so few 
cases, even the facial direction is wrong because the one case 
decided the previous term had a liberal, not a conservative, 
outcome. Ordinarily a vote for individual rights under the 
Constitution has a liberal connotation, but in Metro 
Broadcasting v. Federal Communication Commission the 
claimants were attempting to invalidate a Federal 
Communications Commission regulation giving preference to 
minority applicants for broadcasting licenses. 16 Under the 
circumstances, the majority vote for the preference and against 
the equal protection claim, was a liberal vote. Thus, in reality, 
the equal protection figures for the 1990 term represent a 
conservative shift from the previous term. That would leave 
five tables for the 1990 term pointing in a more conservative 
direction, three in a more liberal direction, and one with little 
change from the previous year. This may suggest a slight tilt in 
a conservative direction, but no more. 
Ironically, the swing-vote table (Table 10) indicates 
movement toward greater liberalism. During the 1989 term, 
64.3% of forty-two cases decided by a single vote went in favor 
of a conservative coalition of justices (not the same five justices 
in every case, but predominantly conservative). For the 1990 
term, based on twenty-three decisions (including one 5-3 
reversal), the comparable figure was 56.5%. 
This table, suggesting a move toward liberalism, is also 
misleading. The basic ideological cleavage on the Court was a 
6-3 division-Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy, 
Souter and White evidencing various shades of conservatism, 
15. "Significant change" as used here does not refer to statistical significance, a 
measurement that we have not undertaken here. For our purposes, we use a rule-
of-thumb that any change of five percentage points or less is probably not very 
significant, as that· term is used in common parlance. 
16. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 1467 (1990). 
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with Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens constituting a more or 
less liberal bloc. Hence many decisions having significant 
ideological content were characterized by a 6-3 or a 5-3 split 
rather than a 5-4 division. These cases are excluded from the 
swing vote table because they were not decided by a single 
vote. By our count there were twenty-five such decisions/7 
and as a group they have a considerably more conservative cast 
(68% conservative, 32% liberal) than the 5-4 cases. 18 
Not all of the majorities comprising a "conservative 
coalition" involved the same six justices, but eleven of the 
eighteen did include Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, 
Souter and White; and two of the 5-3 affirmances in the group 
included all but one of those six. This contrasts with the 5-4 
cases in which no coalition of the same five justices formed the 
majority more than four times. 
We turn now to a more detailed examination of individual 
voting behavior. 
A. Civil Cases with Government Opposing a Private Party 
Table 1 lists summary percentages and the number of 
times each justice voted for the state government in a civil 
dispute with a private litigant. Table 2 gives the same kind of 
data for civil disputes between the federal government and 
private parties. The rankings are generally as expected, with 
conservative justices at the top of the scale (pro-government) 
and liberal justices at the bottom. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist occupies his customary spot at the 
top of both lists, but Justice Marshall relinquished his usual 
place at the bottom of Table 1 to Justice Blackmun and on 
Table 2 to Justice Stevens. Justice White continues to hold his 
customary position in the middle of the state government table 
(but closer to the conservative than the liberal pole in percent 
17. One 5-3 decision is included with the 5-4 decisions in Table 10, rather than 
with the 6-3 decisions, because it was a reversal of a lower court decision rather 
than an affirmance. The swing-vote table is comprised of all cases whose outcome 
would have been changed with the shift of a single vote from the majority coalition 
to the minority. A 5-3 reversal falls in this category because the shift of one vote 
from the majority to the minority position results in affirmance by an equally 
divided court. A 5-3 affirmance is not included in the swing-vote table, however, 
because a shift of one vote would still result in affirmance. 
18. For further data on 6-3 decisions, see infra Table 13 and text accompanying 
note 40. 
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age support of government) and near the top of the federal 
government table. Justice Blackmun again scores relatively 
high in support of the federal government (60%, third ranked) 
but much lower (24%, last in rank) for state government. Jus-
tice Kennedy climbed almost to the top of the state government 
table but remained lower middle in his support of federal gov-
ernment parties. The new justice, Souter, ranks sixth (or tied 
for sixth) in both tables. In the state table, he appears to be the 
least conservative of the conservatives, but he is still nearly 28 
points higher than any of the three liberal members of the 
Court. In the federal table, the differences between liberal and 
conservative justices are less pronounced this year, and Souter 
is closer to the liberal end. 
As compared with the preceding term, the voting in the 
state government table is somewhat more polarized, with con-
servatives generally supporting the government more fre-
quently than the liberals. Majority support for the states is at a 
high for the five year period. By contrast, every member of the 
Court scored lower in percentage support of the federal govern-
ment (Table 2), except for Justice Marshall and Justice Souter 
(no previous record). Majority support for the federal govern-
ment was, by a small margin, at a five-year low. For the first 
time in five years, the state governments prevailed in a larger 
percentage of cases than did the federal government. 
Examination of the state cases in which justices at ideolog-
ical extremes voted contrary to their anticipated pro- or anti-
government leanings shows that the discrepancy is largely 
accounted for by the unanimous decisions. In those cases, we 
assume, the argument for one side or the other was strong 
enough to transcend ideological differences. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, at the top of the scale, never voted against the state 
when the Court was divided. 19 At the other extreme, Justice 
Blackmun voted only once for a state government when the 
decision was not unanimous. This occurred in Columbia v. 
19. Justice Kennedy voted against the state just twice in a divided Court-once 
to reverse the censure of a Nevada attorney for making allegedly prejudicial pre-
trial statements to the press, Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720 
(1991); and a second time in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citi-
zens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991), where he voted 
to void the relevant statute as a separation of powers violation. 
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Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 20 when he joined a 6-3 ma-
jority to hold the city immune from antitrust liability for ac-
tions taken under its zoning power to limit the construction of 
billboards. 
Justice Marshall deviated twice from his expected voting 
behavior in Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Deptartment of Trea-
sury21 and Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Cit-
izens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise. 22 Trivona involved 
state taxation of business, thereby leaving the private party 
without the benefit of the underdog's appeal to the liberal con-
science. Airports raised a separation of powers question and 
appears to have had little discernible ideological content since 
it grouped Justices Marshall, White and Rehnquist in support 
of the government, with all of the others favoring the private 
party. 
In Table 2 (civil cases involving the federal government as 
a party), as in Table 1, most of the unexpected votes at the 
extremes of the ideological scale occurred in unanimous deci-
sions. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White supported the 
federal government most frequently, while only two of their six 
votes against the government involved split decisions. In one of 
the two, EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,23 both justices 
joined a 6-3 majority to reject the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission's claim that U.S. employment discrimination 
laws should apply to the overseas operations of American firms. 
In that case a vote against the government was a conservative 
rather than a liberal position, which makes the vote consistent 
with expectations. The other anti-government vote for each 
justice was cast, respectively, in cases having little obvious 
ideological content.24 
At the other extreme, Justice Stevens had only two non-
unanimous pro-government votes. One occurred in EEOC 
20. 111 S. Ct. 1334 (1991). 
21. 111 S. Ct. 818 (1991). 
22. 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991). 
23. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991). 
24. The Chief Justice voted with the anti-government majority in Cottage Sav-
ings Association v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991), a tax case; and Justice 
White joined the majority in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 
888 (1991), holding that a federal district court had jurisdiction to adjudicate a 
challenge to procedures of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Both were 
7-2 decisions, and both majorities embraced liberal and conservative members of 
the Court. 
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where, as we have noted, the government position was the 
liberal position. The other such vote, Pauley v. Bethenergy 
Mines, Inc.,25 did not reflect a liberal position since it upheld 
Department of Labor regulations making benefits under the 
Black Lung Benefits Act more difficult to obtain. Justice Scalia 
was the only dissenter in that case. Justice Marshall voted 
with Justice Stevens in both instances and, in addition, sup-
ported the govemment in three other decisions where the ideo-
logical lines were not clearly drawn. 26 
B. Criminal Cases 
Table 3, state criminal cases, reflects the same ideological 
divisions as the civil case tables with still greater polarization 
at the extremes. At the conservative pole, the Chief Justice 
supported the prosecution in 81.5% of the decisions, with Jus-
tice Scalia in second place at 74.1%. Justices Marshall and 
Stevens at the liberal extreme never voted for the government, 
while Justice Blackmun voted against the defendant only four 
times. All five of the Chief Justice's votes in favor of the defen-
dant were unanimous decisions. Justice Souter, in his first 
term on the Court, generally upheld the prosecution, although 
not so frequently as the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia. Jus-
tice White supported the prosecution much less often this term 
(1990) than last term (1989) (48.1%, 73.5%), and the Court as a 
whole was also less favorable to the prosecution this term 
(55.6%, 64.7%). 
Suprisingly, voting on federal criminal cases this term, as 
shown in Table 4, does not follow the expected ideological lines. 
Justice Souter, presumed to be one of the Court's conservatives, 
appears most prosecution-oriented; but Justice Scalia-also 
conservative-voted least often for the prosecution. Justices 
Marshall and Kennedy have identical voting records at the 
bottom of the table, while Justice Blackmun near the top has 
the same score as Justice O'Connor and the Chief Justice. All 
of the conservative justices, except Souter (not on the Court 
previously), supported the prosecution less frequently this year, 
25. 111 S. Ct. 2524 (1991). 
26. In Irwin v. Veterans Adminstration, 111 S. Ct. 453 (1991), and United 
States v. Smith, 111 S. Ct. 1180 (1991), only Justice Stevens dissented. The third 
case was Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement 
of Aircraft Noise, 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991), a 6-3 decision that cut across the normal 
ideological divisions on the Court. 
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while the three liberals favored the prosecution in a substan-
tially higher percentage of the cases. 
Unanimous decisions explain only part o( the anomaly. The 
rest is probably attributable to the nature of the crimes before 
the Court. For example, if the voting on three cases involving 
white collar crimes were exactly reversed,27 and the votes on 
the other seven cases remained the same, the rank ordering of 
justices would be as follows: 
justice 
Souter 
Kennedy 
O'Connor 
Rehnquist 
Scalia 
White 
Stevens 
Blackmun 
Marshall 
Majority 
TABLE 11 
Federal Criminal Cases Excluding White Collar Crimes 
With majority Against % with majority 
7 1 87.5 
8 2 80.0 
8 2 80.0 
8 2 80.0 
7 3 70.0 
7 3 70.0 
5 5 50.0 
4 6 40.0 
4 6 40.0 
7 3 70.0 
27. McCormick v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1807 (1991) (Hobbs Act conviction 
of a state legislator for accepting a bribe); Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 
(1991) (tax evasion prosecution); Moskal v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 461 (1990) 
(automobile "title washing"). 
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This rearrangement is much closer to expected rankings, and 
the individual percentages are also more comparable to last 
term. Apparently the nature of the crime has ideological sig-
nificance to justices across the spectrum. 
C. Individual Rights 
Tables 5, 6 and 7, dealing with claims of constitutional and 
statutory civil rights, show the same general voting patterns as 
Tables 1-3 and the adjusted version of Table 4. Liberals occupy 
one end of the scale with conservatives grouped at the other. 
Justice Souter is near the midpoint of each table. Although his 
rank and voting scores clearly mark him as conservative, his 
percentages are in each case closer to the nearest liberal than 
to the most extreme conservative position in the table. Justice 
Marshall is by a small margin the most supportive of individu-
al rights claims, and Chief Justice Rehnquist the least. Justice 
Kennedy appears at the median of the two constitutional rights 
tables, but in adjudicating statutory rights he is at the conser-
vative extreme with the Chief Justice. 
Table 5 (first amendment claims) exhibits the expected 
liberal-conservative voting pattern, except for the relative rank-
ings of Justice O'Connor and Justice Stevens. Although Justice 
Stevens has supported first amendment claims less often than 
Justices Marshall or Blackmun in previous terms, he has had a 
higher support percentage than Justice O'Connor. This term 
the figures are skewed by the inclusion of four separate deci-
sions from a single case, Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Associa-
tion,28 in which the claim of first amendment rights was over-
shadowed by the asserted right of a union to assess dues 
against faculty choosing not to join the union. With the issue 
framed as union rights, liberal members tended to favor the 
union's claim and conservatives tended to oppose it. 
The Lehnert case had a substantial impact on the table 
because it was recorded as four separate decisions, each decid-
ed by a different voting alignment. Thus, Justice Stevens, un-
characteristically voted against the first amendment claim on 
three of four issues; and Justice O'Connor, uncharacteristically, 
voted for the first amendment claim on three of four issues. 
28. 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991). 
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With these decisions excluded from the table, Justice Stevens 
(at 62.5%) and Justice O'Connor (42.9%) would be ranked in 
the order anticipated. The Lehnert case also accounts for all of 
the votes by Justices Blackmun and Marshall against first 
amendment claims in non-unanimous decisions, and for one of 
the two pro-first amendment votes by Justice White and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist. The Chief Justice's other vote for a first 
amendment claim came in support of a publisher in a libel 
suit;29 Justice White's other first amendment vote was a dis-
sent from the Court's decision upholding an Indiana ban on 
non-obscene nude dancing.30 
Table 6 indicates that equal protection decisions this term 
almost precisely followed the anticipated pattern, in contrast to 
some recent terms in which equal protection arguments have 
been invoked to invalidate preferences for minorities or women 
in situations of alleged reverse discrimination.31 When affir-
mative action is mandated by law, conservatives commonly 
support the equal protection claim and liberals oppose it. This 
year, the equal protection clause was invoked in the more tra-
ditional mold. No cases involved legally mandated preferences 
for disadvantaged groups. As expected, liberal members of the 
Court generally supported the equal protection claim, and con-
servatives generally opposed it. The fit was so close that all of 
the votes falling outside this pattern, among five justices at the 
extremes (Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, Rehnquist, Scalia), oc-
curred in unanimous decisions. 32 As a further indication of the 
liberal-conservative split on this issue, the largest percentage 
difference from one rank to the next (33 percentage points) 
occurs between Souter and Stevens. 
The figures in Table 7 (statutory civil rights) also fall with-
in the expected pattern. Justices Marshall, Blackmun and 
Stevens voted most frequently for the claimant, while Justice 
Kennedy and the Chief Justice were willing to support such 
29. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991). 
30. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991). 
31. See, e.g., Robert E. Riggs & Mark T. Urban, Supreme Court Voting Behav-
ior: 1989 Term, 5 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1 (1991). 
32. The table shows two of four decisions against equal protection claims to be 
split votes, leaving two without dissent. It also shows Justice Blackmun and 
Stevens with only one vote each against such a claim, and Justice Marshall with 
none. The apparent discrepancy is explained by the failure of these justices to ad-
dress the equal protection issues. The decisions were without dissent, in the sense 
that no negative vote was cast. 
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claims only when the Court was unanimous. Justice Marshall 
at the other extreme rejected a statutory civil rights claim in 
just two cases-one unanimous and the other a 7-1 decision 
(Stevens the dissenter), which held that the petitioner had 
missed the statutory deadline for appeal of his job discrimina-
tion claim.33 The Court as a whole ruled in favor of the claim-
ant in just over half of the cases, a significant decline from the 
previous term, but more in keeping with its decisions in earlier 
terms. As with equal protection questions, the largest percent-
age gap in individual rankings falls between Souter and 
Stevens. 
D. Jurisdiction and Justiciability Questions 
Table 8 (jurisdiction claims) conforms to our initial as-
sumptions about judicial restraint-the liberal justices appear-
ing more inclined to exercise jurisdiction and the conservative 
justices less so. Indeed, the difference between the three liberal 
and the six conservative is quite marked. Justices Marshall, 
Stevens and Blackmun all fall within a percentage spread of 12 
points, and all six conservative justices are within a 16 percent-
age point range. However, a 16 point gap separates the two 
groups. The gap becomes even larger when unanimous deci-
sions are eliminated from the calculation. Counting only deci-
sions from which one or more justices dissented, the voting on 
jurisdictional questions is as follows: 
33. Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 111 S. Ct. 453 (1991). 
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TABLE 12 
Jurisdictional Decisions with One or More Dissenting Vote 
justice For jurisdiction Against %For 
Stevens 15 98.3 
Marshall 13 3 81.3 
Blackmun 11 5 68.8 
White 6 10 37.5 
Souter 4 11 26.7 
Kennedy 4 12 25.0 
O'Connor 3 13 18.8 
Rehnquist 3 13 18.8 
Scalia 15 6.3 
Using these numbers the total spread is 87.5 percentage points 
(compared with 42.9 in Table 8), and a gap of more than 31 
points emerges between Justice White and Justice Blackmun. 
Whichever scale is used, Justice Scalia-for the fifth consecu-
tive year-has the distinction of voting against the exercise of 
jurisdiction more frequently than any other member of the 
Court. Justice White, for the fourth term in the past five, wP 3 
the conservative most receptive to the exercise of jurisdiction. 
Justice Souter, in his first year, carved out a middle position in 
the conservative group. 
E. Federalism Issues 
Table 9 (federalism issues) deals with questions raised by 
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conflict between federal and state governmental authority.34 
In examining issues of federalism we assume that the more 
conservative justices-Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, 
Souter and White-will tend to favor state authority, while 
Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens will tend to support 
federal authority. That has in fact been the pattern for the past 
three terms, including the most recent (1990) term.35 Justice 
Souter, by virtue of not having participated in one of the deci-
sions, emerged with the highest percentage support for the 
state. His only vote for the United States was with a unani-
mous Court. At the other extreme, Justices Blackmun and 
Marshall supported the state only once, and that case was 
decided without dissent. 
F. Swing-Vote Analysis 
Table 10 shows the number of times each justice voted 
with the majority in cases close enough to be decided by a sin-
gle vote. For the 1990 term we identified twenty-two cases 
decided by 5-4 votes. These, and one 5-3 decision, are included 
in the table.36 In these cases, a shift of any one justice from 
the majority to the minority coalition would create a new ma-
jority and a different result. We call this "swing-vote" analysis 
because it identifies members of the Court who most frequently 
shift or "swing" from one voting coalition to another in order to 
form majorities. Because each vote is crucial to the outcome, 
frequency of voting with the majority in such cases may be 
regarded as one index of influence on Court decision-making. 
The archetypical swing voter on the Court is a person not 
staunchly committed to a liberal or a conservative position who 
votes sometimes with one group and sometimes with the other, 
34. See Appendix A for a more detailed statement of the criteria for inclusion 
in this category. 
35. In 1987 the pattern was not followed. The specific subject matter of the 
federalism cases during that term led liberals to support the state position on the 
six split decisions more frequently than the conservatives. See Robert E. Riggs & 
Michael R. Moss, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1987 Term, 3 BYU J. PuB. L. 
59, 65, 75-76 (1989). 
36. The usual "close case" is a 5-4 decision, but a 5-3 decision is included if it 
reverses or sets aside the lower court decision because, in such a situation, a shift 
of one vote from the majority to the minority would change the outcome to affir-
mance by an equally divided Court. A 5-3 affirmance is not included because the 
lower court decision would be affirmed without opinion by a 4-4 vote. 
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making the crucial difference on close cases. Justice White has 
to some extent filled this role in recent years, as did Justice 
Powell before his retirement.37 During the 1987 term, the first 
year we included swing voting in this survey, Justice White 
voted most frequently with the majority in cases decided by a 
single vote. Justice Kennedy had that honor during the 1988 
term, but Justice White regained the top spot in 1989. This 
year, the 1990 term, the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor 
came in ahead of Justice White, with Justice Kennedy at mid-
point in the rankings. In these twenty-three decisions Justice 
White behaved as the typical swing-voter is supposed to do-he 
voted eleven times with a liberal coalition and twelve times 
with the conservatives. This normally is a recipe for a high 
majority agreement score, but in this instance he joined anum-
ber of losing coalitions and agreed with the majority on only 
thirteen of twenty-two decisions, or 59.1 %. Justice Souter, in 
his first year, is near the middle of the table. No liberal justice 
voted as much as half the time with the majority. 
The most noticeable and in some respects surprising, as-
pect of Table iO is the relatively even distribution of outcomes 
between conservative and liberal majorities for the Court as a 
whole (see bottom two rows of the table).38 Thirteen of the 
close decisions had a conservative outcome and ten were lib-
eral. For a Court supposedly dominated by six conservative 
justices, the 56.5% figure represents a very slim margin of 
dominance. It is especially anomalous when compared with the 
37. For discussion of Justice Powell as a swing-voter, see Janet L. Blasecki, 
Justice Lewis F. Powell: Swing Voter or Staunch Conservative, 52 J. POLS. 530 
(1990). Blasecki argues that Justice Powell was not a swing voter (by her defini-
tion) because he took mainly conservative positions rather than dividing his "decid-
ing votes roughly evenly between" the liberal and conservative blocs. ld. at 533. 
However, her figures for the 1981 through 1986 terms show that Justice Powell 
voted with the majority more often than any other justice in decisions determined 
by one vote margins. ld. at 542. During this same period her figures show Justice 
White running a close second to Justice Powell. 
38. An outcome was classified as liberal if 1) Justices Blackmun, Marshall and 
Stevens were in the majority; 2) the decision went against the government (first 
four tables) or in favor of individual rights, the exercise of jurisdiction or the 
federal as opposed to state claims in federalism questions; and 3) the decision 
otherwise favored the underdog, disadvantaged party, or a labor union. Generally 
all three coincided. If the first and third criteria were satisfied, a contrary reading 
on the second factor was disregarded. An outcome was classified as conservative if 
it had the support of at least four of the conservative justices (ten of the thirteen 
decisions so classified included five of the six conservatives) and, substantively, fa-
vored the government or more powerful party (the reverse of the second and third 
criteria above). 
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64.3% score of the previous term (or 76.5% for the 1988 term) 
when the Court had four liberal members rather than three. 
Moreover, the gap between individual conservative and liberal 
majority agreement percentages was totally obliterated this 
year. During the 1989 term the difference between the conser-
vative with the lowest majority agreement and the liberal with 
the highest was 23.8 percentage points. For 1990 a mere 4.4% 
(a difference of one decision) separated Justices Blackmun and 
Stevens from Justices Kennedy and Scalia. The spread between 
the very highest percentage (Rehnquist and O'Connor, 69.6%) 
and the very lowest (Marshall, 43.5%) was only 26.1 points, 
compared with the 45.3 point spread between the Chief Justice 
and Justice Blackmun during the 1989 term. 
These surprising figures do not mean that the Court, 
against all odds, turned in a liberal direction this year even 
though purported conservatives on the Court had increased in 
number from five to six. Rather, it suggests that cases with 
strong ideological content tended to be decided by 6-3 rather 
than 5-4 majorities. To obtain a 5-4 voting alignment at least 
one conservative justice had to join the liberal cause, and the 
three-justice liberal wing could not prevail without enlisting 
support from two of the six conservatives. Such hybrid align-
ments indicate some degree of ideological ambiguity in the 
issues being resolved.39 This interpretation gains support from 
the following tabulation of individual and majority voting in 
cases decided by a 6-3 margin.40 
39. Of course no two justices have the same intellectual and emotional make-
up. Classifying six as conservative and three as liberal should not be taken to 
imply perfect homogeneity within classifications. The tables amply demonstrate 
individual differences even with respect to the decision characteristics we use to 
distinguish liberals from conservatives. Nevertheless, the labels do distinguish 
tendencies deduced from observed voting behavior that are shared in varying 
degrees by members of the group. 
40. The tabulation includes three 5-3 affirmances of lower court rulings, as well 
as all 6-3 decisions. See supra note 17, for reasons why 5-3 reversals are included 
in table 10. 
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TABLE 13 
6-3 Decisions for 1990 Term 
justice With Majority Against % with Majority 
Souter 22 95.7 
Kennedy 21 4 84.0 
White 21 4 84.0 
Rehnquist 19 6 76.0 
O'Connor 18 6 75.0 
Scalia 18 7 72.0 
Blackmun 10 15 40.0 
Stevens 10 15 40.0 
Marshall 8 17 32.0 
Conservative 
Majority 17 68.0 
Liberal 
Majority 8 32.0 
This tabulation looks much like the 5-4 voting of previous 
years-conservatives with high majority agreement rates and 
liberals with much lower agreement scores, with a large per-
centage gap between the lowest conservative and the highest 
liberal. 
A conservative majority prevailed in 68% of these cases as 
compared with the bare conservative majority of 54.2% in the 
5-4 decisions. This more polarized result suggests that the 
issues in this group of cases had more recognizable ideological 
overtones than the 5-4 cases. If this term's 6-3 decisions are 
compared with last term's 5-4 decisions, a small movement in 
the conservative direction appears. That seems more congruent 
with what we know about the Court, than the alternate hy-
pothesis of a liberal shift based on a comparison of 5-4 deci-
sions for the two terms. 
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One interesting aspect of Table 13 is Justice Souter's posi-
tion at the very top. He achieved this rank by joining a majori-
ty favoring a liberal outcome in five cases and a conservative 
result in seventeen others. He voted only once on the losing 
side in a 6-3 decision.41 Justice White voted more frequently 
for a liberal result in this group of cases (ten times, as com-
pared with five for Souter), but three of his liberal votes were 
in a losing cause. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussion has highlighted some of the pat-
terns and relationships in Supreme Court voting, without ex-
hausting all credible interpretations of the data. The availabili-
ty of information from earlier terms gives an important tempo-
ral dimension to the analysis. For the 1988 term, the voting 
patterns indicated a significant shift to the right when com-
pared with the two previous terms, as well as a tendency for 
more polarized voting and a greater point spread between the 
extremes of the tables. In 1989, the polarization declined and 
conservative dominance moderated, although the membership 
of the Court remained the same as in 1988. The 1990 term, 
despite the retirement of Justice Brennan and the addition of 
Justice Souter, a sixth conservative member of the Court, has 
had only a very modest overall tilt in a conservative direction. 
As expected, Justice Souter generally voted with the conserva-
tives, but he was more often in a moderate conservative posi-
tion in the tables than at the extreme. In the federal criminal 
and federalism categories he occupied the extreme conservative 
position, but both categories had very few cases and his per-
centage margin over closely ranked fellow conservatives ap-
pears attributable to his non-participation in a few relevant 
decisions, rather than to more conservative voting in cases 
where all participated. For the 1991 term we may anticipate 
new patterns and alignments with the replacement of Justice 
Marshall by the more conservative JusticP Thomas. 
41. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991). On one of the four 
first amendment issues decided by different voting alignments in that case, Justice 
Souter voted with Justices Scalia and O'Connor, against the union's position. 
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V. APPENDIX 
A. Explanation of Criteria for Selection 
and Classification of Cases 
1. The universe of cases 
[Volume 6 
Only cases decided during the 1990 term by a full opinion 
setting forth reasons for the decision are included in the data. 
Decisions on motions are excluded, even if accompanied by an 
opinion. Cases handled by summary disposition are included if 
accompanied by a full opinion of the Court, but not if the only 
opinion is a dissent. Cases decided by a four-to-four vote, hence 
resulting in affirmance without written opinion, are excluded. 
Both signed and per curiam opinions are considered full opin-
ions if they set forth reasons in a more than perfunctory man-
ner. Cases not fitting any of the ten categories are, of course, 
not included in the data base for any of the tables. 
2. Cases classified as civil or criminal 
The classification of cases as civil or criminal follows com-
monly accepted definitions; generally, the nature of the case is 
clearly identified in the opinion. Only occasionally does a case 
pose a problem of classification. No cases this year raised such 
a question. 
3. Cases classified by nature of the parties-
Tables 1 through 4 
Cases are included in Tables 1 through 4 only if govern-
mental and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is 
necessarily true of criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded from 
these tables if they do not satisfy this criterion. The govern-
mental entity might be the government itself, one of its agen-
cies or officials, or, with respect to state government, one of its 
political subdivisions. A suit against an official in his or her 
personal capacity is included if he or she is represented by 
government attorneys, or if the interests of the government are 
otherwise clearly implicated. In instances of multiple parties, a 
civil case is excluded if governmental entities appear on both 
sides of the controversy. If both a state and a federal entity are 
parties to the same suit on the same side with only private 
parties on the other, the case is included in Tables 1 and 2. A 
case is included more than once in the same table if it raises 
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two or more distinct issues affecting the outcome of the case, 
and the issues are resolved by differing voting alignments. 
4. Classification by nature of the issue-Tables 5 through 9 
A case is included in each category of Tables 5 through 9 
for which it raises a relevant issue that is addressed in the 
written opinion(s). One case may thus be included in two or 
more tables. A case is also included more than once in the 
same table if it raises two or more distinct issues in that cate-
gory affecting the disposition of the case, and if the issues are 
resolved by different voting alignments. A case is not included 
for any issue which, though raised by one of the litigants, is not 
addressed in any opinion. 
Identification of first amendment and equal protection 
issues poses no special problem. In each instance, the nature of 
the claim is expressly identified in the opinion. Issues of 
speech, press, association, and free exercise of religion are 
included. However, establishment clause cases are excluded 
because one party's claim of religious establishment is often 
aligned against another party's claim of free exercise or some 
other individual right, thus blurring the issue of individual 
rights. 
Cases included in Table 7, statutory civil rights claims, are 
limited to those invoking relevant sections of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, as amended; the Voting Rights Act of 1965; and 
the civil rights statutes expressly barring discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, or physi-
cal handicap. Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are in-
cluded if the substantive right asserted is based on a federal 
statute or if the issue is the application of section 1983-that 
is, whether or how that section's protections apply in the case 
at hand. However, section 1983 actions are excluded if the 
substantive right asserted is based on the United States Con-
stitution and the issue relates to the constitutional right. The 
purpose of the section 1983 exclusion is to preserve a distinc-
tion between constitutional and non-constitutional claims. 
For Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include 
not only jurisdiction per se but also standing, mootness, ripe-
ness, abstention, equitable discretion, and justiciability. Juris-
dictional questions are excluded if neither party challenges 
jurisdiction and no member of the Court dissents on the ques-
tion, even though the Court may comment on its jurisdiction. 
Table 9 (federalism cases) is limited to issues raised by 
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conflicting actions of federal and state or local governments. 
Common examples are preemption, intergovernmental immuni-
ties, application of the tenth and eleventh amendments as a 
limit on action by the federal government, and federal court 
interference with state court activities (other than review of 
state court decisions). Issues of "horizontal" federalism or inter-
state relationships, such as those raised by the dormant com-
merce clause or the privileges and immunities clause, are ex-
cluded from the table. 
5. The ((swing-vote" cases 
Table 10 includes all cases where the outcome turns on a 
single vote. This category is also intended to include four-to-
three decisions, if any, as well as five-to-three and four-to-two 
decisions resulting in reversal of a lower court decision. 
Mfirmances by a vote of five-to-three or four-to-two are not 
included because a shift of one vote from the majority to the 
minority position would still result in affirmance by a tie vote. 
A case is included more than once in the table if it raises two 
or more distinct issues affecting the disposition of the case and 
the issues are resolved by differing five-to-four (four-to-three, 
etc.) voting alignments. 
B. Cases Included in Statistical Tables42 
Table 1: Civil Cases: State/Local Government versus Private Party 
Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 111 S. Ct. 415 (1990). 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991). 
Blatchford v. Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991). 
Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991). 
Burns v. Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991). 
Burns v. Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991). 
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991). 
Clark v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2096 (1991). 
Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105 (1991). 
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991). 
Dennis v. Higgins, 111 S. Ct. 865 (1991). 
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991). 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991). 
Houston Lawyers Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991). 
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991). 
42. Cases listed more than once in a table are those with more than one voting 
alignment within the category. 
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Kay v. Ehrler, 111 S. Ct. 1435 (1991). 
Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991). 
McCarthy v. Bronson, 111 S. Ct. 1737 (1991). 
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Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 
111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991). 
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 111 S. Ct. 905 
(1991). 
Renne v. Geary, 111 S. Ct. 2331 (1991). 
Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 111 S. Ct. 818 (1991). 
West Virginia Univ. Hasp's., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991). 
Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991). 
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991). 
Table 2: Civil Cases: Federal Government versus Private Party 
Air Courier Conference v. American Postal Workers Union, 111 S. Ct. 913 (1991). 
American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 1539 (1991). 
Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 111 S. Ct. 415 (1990). 
Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991). 
Demarest v. Manspeaker, 111 S. Ct. 599 (1991). 
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991). 
Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631 (1991). 
International Primate Protection League v. Tulane Educ. Fund, 111 S. Ct. 1700 (1991). 
Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 111 S. Ct. 453 (1990). 
Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 2215 (1991). 
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 888 (1991). 
Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 2157 (1991). 
Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 
111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991). 
Mobil Oil Exploration v. United Distribution Co., 111 S. Ct. 615 (1991). 
Norfolk & W. Ry. v. American Train Dispactchers Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1156 (1991). 
Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2524 (1991). 
Siegert v. Gilley, 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991). 
Stevens v. Department of Treasury, 111 S. Ct. 1562 (1991). 
United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991). 
United States v. Smith, 111 S. Ct. 1180 (1991). 
Table 3: State Criminal Cases 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). 
Burden v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 862 (1991). 
Cage v. Louisiana, 111 S. Ct. 328 (1990). 
California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991). 
California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991). 
Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). 
Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991). 
Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801 (1991). 
Ford v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 850 (1991). 
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Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991). 
Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). 
Lankford v. Idaho, 111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991). 
Lozada v. Deeds, 111 S. Ct. 860 (1991). 
McClesky v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991). 
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991). 
Michigan v. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. 1743 (1991). 
Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990). 
Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991). 
Parker v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct. 731 (1991). 
Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). 
Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991). 
Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991). 
Shell v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 313 (1990). 
Yates v. Evatt, 111 S. Ct. 1884 (1991). 
Yist v. Nunnemaker, 111 S. Ct. 2590 (1991). 
Table 4: Federal Criminal Cases 
Braxton v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1854 (1991). 
Burns v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2182 (1991). 
Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct . 1919 (1991). 
Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991). 
Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 840 (1991). 
McCormick v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1807 (1991). 
Moskal v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 461 (1990). 
Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661 (1991). 
Touby v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1752 (1991). 
United States v. R. Enter., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 722 (1991). 
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Table 5: Cases Raising a Challenge to First Amendment Rights of Expression, 
Association, and Free Exercise 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991). 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). 
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991). 
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991). 
Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991). 
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991). 
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991). 
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991). 
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991). 
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991). 
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991). 
Renne v. Geary, 111 S. Ct. 2331 (1991). 
Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). 
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Table 6: Cases Involving Equal Protection Claims 
Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991). 
Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919 (1991). 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991). 
Ford v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 850 (1991). 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991). 
Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). 
Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991). 
Table 7: Cases Involving Statutory Civil Rights Claims 
Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 111 S. Ct. 2166 (1991). 
Burns v. Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991). 
Burns v. Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991). 
Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991). 
Clark v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2096 (1991). 
Dennis v. Higgins, 111 S. Ct. 865 (1991). 
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991). 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991). 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991). 
Houston Lawyers Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991). 
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991). 
Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 111 S. Ct. 453 (1990). 
Kay v. Ehrler, 111 S. Ct. 1435 (1991). 
Stevens v. Department of Treasury, 111 S. Ct. 1562 (1991). 
West Virginia Univ. Hosp's., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991). 
Table 8: Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of Jurisdiction 
Air Courier Conference v. American Postal Workers Union, 111 S. Ct. 913 (1991). 
Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 111 S. Ct. 2166 (1991). 
Blatchford v. Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991). 
Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991). 
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991). 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). 
Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). 
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991). 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991). 
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991). 
Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2071 (1991). 
FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 111 S. Ct. 648 (1991). 
Ford v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 850 (1991). 
Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 858 (1991). 
Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631 (1991). 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991). 
Gollust v. Mendell, 111 S. Ct. 2173 (1991). 
Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 111 S. Ct. 498 (1990). 
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International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. Brown, 111 S. Ct. 880 (1991). 
International Primate Protection League v. Tulane Educ. Fund, 111 S. Ct. 1700 (1991). 
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International Primate Protection League v. Tulane Educ. Fun1, 111 S. Ct. 1700 (1991). 
Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 111 S. Ct. 453 (1990). 
Lozada v. Deeds, 111 S. Ct. 860 (1991). 
McClesky v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991). 
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 888 (1991). 
Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 
111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991). 
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 111 S. Ct. 905 
(1991). 
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 111 S. Ct. 905 
(1991). 
Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661 (1991). 
Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991). 
Renne v. Geary, 111 S. Ct. 2331 (1991). 
Stevens v. Department of Treasury, 111 S. Ct. 1562 (1991). 
Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991). 
United States v. Smith, 111 S. Ct. 1180 (1991). 
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991). 
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 111 S. Ct. 2590 (1991). 
Table 9: Cases Raising a Federalism Issue 
Blatchford v. Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991). 
Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). 
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403 (1990). 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991). 
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990). 
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991). 
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 111 S. Ct. 2590 (1991). 
Table 10: Swing-Vote Cases 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991). 
Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991). 
Burns v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2182 (1991). 
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922 
(1991). 
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991). 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). 
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991). 
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991). 
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991). 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991). 
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991). 
Lankford v. Idaho, 111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991). 
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991). 
Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 2215 (1991). 
Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991). 
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Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 111 S. Ct. 2281 (1991). 
Parker v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct. 731 (1991). 
Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661 (1991). 
Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991). 
Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991). 
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991). 
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